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INTRODUCTION

In 1964, Russell and Betty Burr adopted a seventeen month old boy.1 The
Burrs were informed that the child was a "nice, big, healthy, baby boy" and
1. Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (Ohio 1986).
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was being put up for adoption by a young, unwed mother who did not feel
she could give him the life he deserved. 2 Based on this information, the
Burrs welcomed the child, Patrick, as a member of their family. 3
In the ensuing years Patrick suffered a number of maladies including
mental retardation and hallucinations.4 Ultimately, Patrick was diagnosed
as having Huntington's Disease, a genetically inherited disease that attacks

the central nervous system.5 In a desperate attempt to treat Patrick's disease, the Burrs obtained a court order to open the sealed records containing
the background information and medical history of Patrick's natural parents.6 The information these records disclosed was truly shocking.7
Astonishingly, the records revealed that, except for Patrick's age and sex,
all of the information given to the Burrs in 1964 was false.' Patrick's natural
mother had, in reality, been a thirty one year old institutionalized, mental
patient. 9 Patrick's father was unknown but was presumed to have been a
mental patient as well.1 ° Even more alarming was the fact that prior to
Patrick's adoption, the adoption agency had performed psychological assessments which indicated that Patrick functioned at a low intellectual level and

2. Id. The adoption agency's caseworker explained that the child's natural mother was
an eighteen year old unwed mother who believed adoption was the best alternative for her
child. The Burrs were informed that the mother was attempting to work and take care of her
child. The Burrs were further informed that the mother chose to place her child for adoption
because she planned to pursue employment in Texas and did not want to leave him with her
grandparents who mistreated him. Id.
3. Id. The Burrs alleged that it was the information provided by the adoption agency
which cemented their decision to adopt. See id. at 1104 (alleging that if provided with truthful
information, no decision to adopt would have been made).
4. Id. Patrick suffered from a number of physical as well as mental problems and was
eventually classified as mentally retarded but educable through special education classes. Patrick's maladies included, among other things, poor motor skills, a speech impediment, and
learning disabilities. Id.
5. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103. Huntington's Disease is defined as "a chronic disease affecting persons between the ages of 30 and 50, marked by choreic movement [irregular, involuntary movement] in the limbs and face, loss of mental faculties, and dementia (mental
deterioration). Death usually follows within 15 years." 1 J.E. SCHMIDT, M.D., ATrORNEY'S
DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER § C-153 (1991). If the disease develops during childhood, as it did with Patrick, the average life expectancy is reduced to 8.5 years. Burr,
491 N.E.2d at 1103.
6. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103.
7. See id. at 1103-04 (adoption agency intentionally misrepresented pertinent medical history of adopted child).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1104. Patrick's natural mother had been diagnosed as idiopathic and bovine. Id.
An idiopathic disease is defined as "a disease the cause of which is unknown." 2 J.E.
SCHMIDT, M.D., ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER § 1-7 (1991).
Bovine is defined as "like cattle, resembling the facial appearance of a cow." Id. § B- 116.
10. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1104.
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had the potential for future deviant social and emotional behavior."

Most

shocking was the revelation that the adoption agency potentially
had knowl12

edge that Patrick was at risk for Huntington's Disease.
Based on these tragic facts, in 1986 the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Burr v.
Board of County Commissioners,' 3 affirmed an award of damages Ifor the
4
adoption' 5 was created. 6

Burrs.'

Thus, the tort known as wrongful

This comment examines the circumstances that necessitated the development of a cause of action for wrongful adoption and, after explaining the
current state of the tort nationally, proposes a direction for its continued

development and application in Texas.
11. Id.
12. Id. Although Patrick's natural mother was never diagnosed as suffering from Huntington's Disease, expert testimony established that his family history put him at risk for developing the disease. Id.
13. 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986).
14. See id. at 1108 (affirming award of $125,000). The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
award determining that the record amply proved the existence of each element of a fraud. Id.
The court listed the elements of a fraud as:
(a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact;
(b) which is material to the transaction at hand;
(c) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred;
(d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it;
(e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment; and
(f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.
Id. at 1102 (citing Cohen v. Lamko, Inc., 462 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ohio 1984)). The facts in Burr
established a set of circumstances fulfilling the requirements of each of these elements. Claire
Grandpre' Combs, Note, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 343, 350-51 (1987). Texas case law defines fraud
in much the same way. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1171-72
(1982) (defining elements of fraud in Texas).
15. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADoPTION, ADOPION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES
DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 132 (1989).

Wrongful adoption refers to a growing number of lawsuits filed by adoptive parents
against public adoption agencies. These families have claimed that the agencies misrepresented the physical and/or emotional condition of the child at the time of adoption and
that, had they had complete and accurate information, they either would not have
adopted the child in the first place or would have provided early and necessary treatment
for the child.
Id.
16. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103-04. The term "wrongful adoption" had not been used by
any appellate court in the nation prior to the Burr case. John R. Maley, Note, Wrongful
Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 710 (1987).
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II. BACKGROUND

The practice of adoption 17 is ancient and has followed a unique path of
development."i Early adoption, as practiced by the Romans, was governed
by well established, intricate laws.' 9 However, the common law of England
failed to follow the direction of the Romans and neither recognized, nor
established rules governing the adoption of children.2' Similarly, the United

17. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES
DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 2 (1989).
Adoption is a legal procedure in which a person or couple takes a child that is not their
offspring into the family and raises the child as their own; this child may be unrelated to
either adoptive parent, may be the child of one member of the couple, or may be related in
some other way to the adoptive parents. Adoption severs all legal ties between the
adoptee and his or her birth parents (except when one birth parent is a member of the
adopting couple), and establishes such ties between the adoptee and the adoptive parents.
Legally, the adoptee has the same status with respect to his or her adoptive parents as do
any nonadopted siblings.
Id. In Texas, the adoptee possibly has more status than his nonadopted siblings. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (providing that after termination of natural
parent-child relationship, child retains right to inherit from and through divested parent).
18. Louis Quarles, The Law ofAdoption-A LegalAnomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV. 237, 237
(1949). See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 923 (1991) (discussing development of adoption
in United States). See generally HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.1 (2d. ed. 1988) (tracing historical background of adoption).
19. Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11
J. FAM. L. 443, 446-48 (1971). While the earliest codes of law refer to adoption, the Romans
most fully developed adoption law. Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 744 (1956). Roman adoption law established that once an
adoption was finalized, the adoptee's ties with his natural family were severed and he was
incorporated as a full member of the new, adoptive family. Id. at 745. Furthermore, the
Romans recognized adoption in two forms: adoptio and adrogatio. HOMER H. CLARK, JR.,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.1, at 850-51 (2d ed. 1988).
Adrogatio applied to the adoption of adults. Id. § 20.1, at 851. Adoptio dealt with the adoption
of unemancipated children and is the precursor of modern adoption law. Id. § 20.1, at 850-5 1.
However, unlike modern adoption law, which serves the "best interests" of the child, Roman
adoption law clearly benefited the adopter. See Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 745 (1956) (noting that under Roman law, welfare of
adoptee irrelevant). In fact, Roman adoption law served only two broad purposes: to prevent
extinction of a family, and to perpetuate family religious worship. John Francis Brosnan, The
Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332 (1922).
20. See Leo Albert Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV.
743, 745-46 (1956) (explaining that English regard for blood lineage curtailed development of
adoption). As a result of this lack of recognition, legal fictions were occasionally necessary to
achieve the same result as an adoption. Id. at 746. The use of one such fiction, that the child
of a married woman is the offspring of her husband, led to the amusing result that although a
woman's husband had been at sea for over three years, her child was held to be legitimate. Id.
Ultimately logic triumphed and in 1926 adoption was statutorily recognized in England. Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L.
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States, whose laws are based on the English common law, was slow to recognize the legitimacy and necessity of adoption law. 1
Despite the slow recognition of adoption in the United States, the development of modem American adoption law can be isolated to a single, key
event: passage of the "Act to Provide for the Adoption of Children ' 2 2 by
the Massachusetts Legislature in 1851.23 The Massachusetts statute, and
those that followed its lead, placed the welfare of the child before the interests of the adoptors, thus marking a dramatic break with the precepts of the

443, 443 (1971). Despite the logic of recognizing adoption, almost a century passed before
lobbying efforts convinced Parliament of the need for statutory adoption law. Jamil S.
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and
the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1045 (1979).
21. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 923 (1991) (noting that early English substitutes
for adoption were imported by America). Early American substitutes for adoption included
indentured servitude, as well as the more appealing use of "orphan trains," precursors of modem adoption agencies. Id. at 923-24. Under these early practices the "adopters" never formally adopted the children and had no legal responsibility to care for them. Id. at 924.
Adoption did receive some recognition on a case-by-case basis in those states which were influenced by Roman adoption law through prior French or Spanish rule. See Teal v. Sevier, 26
Tex. 516, 521 (1863) (denying adoption because Spanish law forbade parent with legitimate
child to adopt); see also Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modem, 9
VAND. L. REV. 743, 747 (1956) (noting existence of Roman-style adoption in early Louisiana
and Texas case law). Similarly, "private" acts authorizing a specific adoption were enacted in
the first half of the nineteenth century. See generally Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 461-464 (1971) (tracing private
acts which predated general American adoption law).

22. MASS.

REV. STAT.

ch. 324 (1851).

23. Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV 1038, 1042 (1979). In all fairness, other general adoption statutes were passed in Texas and Vermont prior to the
Massachusetts provision. MORTON L. LEAVY & Roy D. WEINBERG, LAW OF ADOPTION 2
(4th ed. 1979). However, such statutes made no requirement of either public supervision or a
determination of an adoption's propriety. Id. In reality, these statutes served merely to make
private adoption agreements a matter of public record. Id. It also appears that Mississippi
allowed adoption as early as 1846. Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and
Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 748 (1956). However, comparing the Mississippi provision
with its counterpart in Massachusetts, the latter is more complete. Id. The Massachusetts
provision pioneered American adoption law by requiring 1) the birth parents' written consent,
2) a joint petition including both adoptive parents, 3) a judicial adoption decree, and 4) a
complete, legal severance between the child and the biological parents. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS
AND RESOURCES 18 (1989). This sudden development of statutory adoption law is all the
more unique because there is no clear explanation as to what prompted such action. Jamil S.
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and
the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1043 (1979). Furthermore, passage of the
Massachusetts' statute received little attention and the provision was seldom used for several
years after its conception. Id.
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ancient Roman adoption law. 24 It is this focus on the "best interests ' 25 of

24. See ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 32 (1978) (noting that
from outset, American adoption law focused on welfare of adopted child). The Massachusetts
statute acknowledged the adopted child as the prime beneficiary of the adoption transaction.
Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 1038, 1042-43 (1979). However, the
statute may have also served the purpose of protecting adoptive parents from extortion by
biological parents threatening to regain custody of an adopted child. Id. at 1044 n.13.
Notwithstanding this other purpose, the focus on the "best interests" of the adopted child is a
unique American contribution to modem adoption law. Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 749 (1956). Using the Massachusetts statute
as a template, several other states soon recognized adoption, and today adoption is uniformly
recognized throughout the United States. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging
Rights ofAdoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 924 (1991). Adoption law in the United States is, for all practical purposes, overseen by the states via judicial
interpretation of statutory law. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION
FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 2 (1989).
25. Because of its abstract nature, the term "best interests" is not commonly given a
precise definition. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rulesfor Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1984) (describing best interests standard as
simple, egalitarian, and flexible). Because of this flexible standard, a number of relevant factors can be considered in ascertaining the child's best interests. See generally Richard A. Edwards, Note, Adoption-The Welfare and Best Interest of the Child, 5 WILLIAMErE L. REV.
93, 93-103 (1968) (discussing factors considered in determining child's best interests). Furthermore, because statutes which require that a decision affecting a child's welfare be in his
best interests commonly do not name the factors to be considered, it is most often case law that
defines these elements. See id. at 93 (explaining that Oregon statute leaves court with wide
discretion to determine child's best interests). For example, in Texas the factors used to determine whether the termination of a parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests
include:
1) the child's desires; 2) the child's emotional and physical needs now and in the future; 3)
the enotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; 4) the parental
abilities of those seeking custody; 5) their plans for the child; 6) the stability of the existing
home; 7) the parent's acts or omissions which may indicate that the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and 8) any excuses for the parents acts or omissions.
Byrne v. Catholic Charities, Diocese of San Angelo, 710 S.W.2d 780, 781-82 (Tex. App.Austin 1986, no writ) (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-372 (Tex. 1976)).
Although the flexibility of the best interest standard seemingly allows judges to make decisions
concerning a child's welfare based on a number of relevant factors, it is possible that a judge
will give unjustified weight to a given factor that may itself be impossible to measure. See
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MICH. L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1984) (discussing strengths and weaknesses of best interest standard). Because of this uncertainty, other standards have been proposed. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53-54 (1973) (proposing "the
least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development" as
superior standard). However, if the standard is viewed not as a legal principle but simply as an
understanding that the child's welfare must prevail against other competing claims, it serves as
an effective guideline. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES § 14.2, at 788 (2d. ed. 1988) (analyzing application of best interest standard as applied in child custody disputes).
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the adopted child that is common to the uniform recognition of adoption
within the United States today.2 6
Notwithstanding the fact that the best interests of the child is the overarching concern of modern adoption law, present statutes also seek to protect the interests of the biological parents." However, adoptive parents, the
last element in the adoption triangle, are noticeably lacking in statutory protection.28 Regardless of the causes for this anomaly,29 the fact remains that
26. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 20.7, at 909 (2d. ed. 1988) (categorizing best interest of adoptee as ultimate standard

in analyzing propriety of adoption); see also Christopher J. Dodd, Comment, The Adoption of
Baby Lenore: Two Interpretationsof a Child's Best Interests, 11 J. FAM. L. 285, 287-88 (1971)
(noting modem adoption law's emphasis on welfare of child). Statutes governing adoption
also take into account the interests of other relevant parties. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 20.1, at 851 (2d ed. 1988) (purpose
of statutes is to protect all parties to adoption process). However, it is the child's best interests
that clearly controls modern adoption statutes. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 221.63 (Deering

Supp. 1991) (providing for court order of adoption if interest of child promoted by such action); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.1 (West 1981) (mandating welfare of adopted child as paramount consideration); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-101 (1991) (making protection of children
primary purpose); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.08 (Vernon 1986) (judicial determination of
child's best interests prerequisite to granting of adoption decree). The trial courts which apply
such statutes are given wide discretion to determine a child's best interests. See, e.g., In the
Interest of W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (finding no basis for reversal of trial
court's denial of adoption absent abuse of discretion); Green v. Remling, 608 S.W.2d 905, 908
(Tex. 1980) (interpreting state adoption law as investing trial court with broad discretionary
power). As such, the fate of an adoptee may rest in the hands of an individual judge. See
Susan L. Brooks, Comment, Rethinking Adoption: A FederalSolution to the Problem of Permanency Planningfor Children with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1136 (1991)
(arguing that vague standards leave fate of adoptee completely within judicial discretion).
27. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 924 (1991) (noting protection modern adoption
statutes grant biological parents). The decision to terminate a parent-child relationship can be
very traumatic. See ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 54 (1978) (discussing psychological effect of adoption on biological parents). As such, it is a general rule
under today's adoption statutes that absent the consent of the biological parents, an adoption is

void. Christopher J. Dodd, Comment, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Two Interpretationsof a
Child's Best Interests, 11 J. FAM. L. 285, 288 (1971); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03(b)
(Vernon 1986) (requiring termination of parent-child relationship prior to consideration of
adoption petition).
28. Constance J. Miller, Comment, Best Interestsof Childrenand the Interests of Adoptive
Parents: Isn't it Time for Comprehensive Reform?, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 749, 756 (1986). This is
in no way an indication that the adoption process is somehow less troublesome to adoptive
parents. See generally NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK,
UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 12-14 (1989) (noting effect
of nine social trends on adoption process). For example, the legalization of abortion has reduced the number of children which would have potentially been adopted. Id. at 12. At the
same time, adoptable babies remain in high demand due to increased infertility. Id. at 13. In
situations where the individuals seeking to adopt are infertile, the emotional impact that comes
with this condition compounds the difficulty of the adoption process. See ARTHUR. D.
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adoptive parents hold a precarious position in the adoption process. 30
Those who choose to adopt necessarily rely on the information provided
by an adoption agency in making their decision. 3 I As such, adoptive parents

SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 74, 84 (1978) (discussing impact of infertility on
adoption process).
29. Traditional views on adoption and the participants in the adoption process have not
been favorable. See Nancy Gibbs, The Baby Chase, TIME, Oct. 9, 1989, at 87 (noting past use
of derogatory language in defining parties to adoption). The birthmother was portrayed as
"promiscuous," the child as a "bastard," and the adoptive parents as "barren". Id. Today,
those who choose to adopt may be viewed as wealthy baby-shoppers who exploit the poorer,
biological parents. See Comment, Revocation of ParentalConsent to Adoption: Legal Doctrine
and Social Policy, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 564, 569 n.42 (1961) (describing revocation of adoption
based on judge's sentimental view of adoption process). A more appropriate view is to recognize that those who adopt may do so for reasons which are common to all parents, biological
or adoptive. See ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 74 (1978) (citing

sense of societal duty, value of having children as incentives for adoption). The obstacles
presented by outdated stereotypes are compounded by the lack of progressive statutory change
in adoption laws since their inception. See Linda F. Smith, Adoption-The Case for More
Options, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 495, 500-01 (noting uniform history of adoption legislation).
Many of these outdated practices may have been a cause of, rather than a shield from, many of
the problems within the adoption process. See ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION

TRIANGLE 220 (1978) (arguing for reevaluation of adoption policies).
30. See, e.g., Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr.
504, 505-06 (Cal. App. 1988) (probability of adopted child's future complications withheld);
Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1103-04 (Ohio 1986) (adoptive parents
victimized by fraud); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc. of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 533 (Wis.
1989) (adoptive parents negligently misinformed as to health of adopted child). As these cases
represent, the lack of clear, up-to-date guidelines has allowed for the disclosure of inadequate
information concerning the pertinent history of an adopted child. Susan L. Brooks, Comment,
Rethinking Adoption: A FederalSolution to the Problem of PermanencyPlanningfor Children
with Special Needs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1141 (1991). As such, adoptive parents are
denied the opportunity to make an informed choice about adoption. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at
1109 (analogizing adoptive parents' right to informed decision with similar right held by biological parents). A related vulnerability for adoptive parents is a misrepresentation made, not
by the party providing information about the adoptee, but instead from a related party. See
John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to
Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 711 n. 18
(1987) (discussing "related adoption"). In this situation the misrepresentation is made by one
adoptive parent against the other and usually serves some financial purpose for the party making the misrepresentation. Id. at 711-12. Because a wrongful adoption action involves an
unrelated adoption (no connection between child and adopters prior to the adoption), a discussion of the risks involved in a related adoption is beyond the scope of this comment.
31. Generally, there are two categories of infant adoption: 1) adoptions through licensed
agencies, and 2) adoptions independent of licensed agencies. Sharon Fast Gustafson, Regulating Adoption Intermediaries: Ensuring that the Solutions are no Worse than the Problem, 3
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 837, 842 (1990). The majority of unrelated adoptions are performed
by agencies. See NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED

STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 3 (1989) (approximately 69% of un-

related adoptions in 1986 were handled by agencies). Also, state-operated agencies perform
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are particularly vulnerable to misrepresentations about the pertinent history
of the adoptee3 2 Although a number of potential remedies exist to assist
those who are intentionally or negligently misled,33 an increasing number of
adoptive parents who have been denied the right to make an informed deci-

more adoptions than their private counterparts. See id. (approximately 57% of unrelated,
agency adoptions in 1986 were handled by state-operated agencies). When an adoption is
handled by an agency, the biological mother releases her child to the agency, and the agency
makes the choice of an appropriate adoptive home. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The
Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 934
(1991). In an independent adoption the adoptive parents and the biological parents meet prior
to the adoption and arrange the transaction amongst themselves or with the aid of an intermediary. Sharon Fast Gustafson, Regulating Adoption Intermediaries: Ensuring that the Solutions are No Worse than the Problem, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCs 837, 842 (1990). The growing
number of wrongful adoption lawsuits reflect a desire to recover for the misrepresentations of a
public adoption agency. NATIONAL COMMrITEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK,
UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 132 (1989). However, under
Texas adoption law, any facility placing children for adoption in Texas is either state-operated
or must be licensed by the state. TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 42.041 (a), (b) (Vernon
1990). Accordingly, this comment will use the term "adoption agency" in a generic manner to
mean either a private or state-operated facility.
32. See Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 533 (adoptive parents victimized by agency's negligent
misrepresentations); see also Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (adoptive parents potentially
victimized by agency's fraudulent concealment); Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103-04 (adoptive parents victimized by agency's fraudulent representations). These misrepresentations deny the
adoptive parents the right to make an informed decision about adoption. See Susan Kempf
LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 487
(1989) (analogizing denial of informed decision to wrongful birth tort). The greater the surprise which inevitably comes from these misrepresentations, the greater the difficulty borne by
the adoptive parents. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive
Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 945 (1991) (noting that adoptions fail
less frequently when adopters are given accurate information).
33. See Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause ofAction,
27 J. FAM. L. 475, 488 (1989) (noting inadequacy of current remedies). One alternative is an
annulment, or setting aside, of the adoption decree. Id. at 480-81. This remedy is impractical
because the majority of jurisdictions have very short limitations periods which allow little time
for adoptive parents to discover an agency's misrepresentations. See Anne Harlan Howard,
Note, Annulment of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J. FAM. L. 549, 565
app. (1984) (listing limitations periods of annulment provisions within United States). Furthermore, although it traditionally has been accepted that an adoption decree can be annulled
upon a showing of fraud or misrepresentation, only one state allows an annulment of an adoption if the adopted child develops some mental illness or developmental disability which existed prior to the adoption. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 227b (Deering 1990) (allowing annulment
if complications occur within five years of adoption decree). However, even under this provision, the court's decision to grant an annulment is discretionary. See id. (providing that court
"may" grant annulment if necessary facts are proven). Financial subsidies are another possible
remedy. Susan Kempf Lemay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27
J. FAM. L. 475, 483-84 (1989). However, such subsidy programs are designed to encourage the
adoption of children with special needs and require that the subsidy agreement be signed
before adoption. See Sanford N. Katz, Subsidized Adoption in America, 10 FAM. L.Q. 3, 4
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sion about
adoption are turning to wrongful adoption as their only
34
recourse.

III.

A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WRONGFUL ADOPTION

Case Law: Determining the Boundaries of an Emerging Tort
1. Burr v. Board of County Commissioners

The importance of disclosing the pertinent history of an adopted child and
the vulnerability of adoptive parents to inadequacies in the adoption process
are tragically displayed in the facts of the 1986 decision by the Ohio
Supreme Court, Burr v. Board of County Commissioners." In Burr, the
court recognized a cause of action for wrongful adoption and strengthened
the rights of adoptive parents 3 6by affirming an award of monetary damages
for victims of adoption fraud.

(1976) (discussing purpose of Model State Subsidized Adoption Act, upon which a number of
state statutes are based).

34. See

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE FOR ADoPTION,

ADOPTION

FACTBOOK, UNITED

132-33 (1989) (discussing increasing
number of wrongful adoption lawsuits). The divergence in the rules developed in these cases
demonstrates the evolving nature of this tort. See id. at 132-33 (noting inadequate exploration
of issues involved in wrongful adoption). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin paved the way for
the emerging trend of adoptive parents seeking recovery under the wrongful adoption theory.
See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (allowing recovery for adoption agency's fraudulent misrepresentations). The tort has subsequently evolved. See Michael J, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (allowing
recovery for fraudulent concealment of adoptee's history); see also Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537
(allowing recovery for adoption agency's negligent misrepresentations). However, the tort is
not fully developed. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The EmergingRights of Adoptive
Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 962-63 (1991) (noting inconsistency in
wrongful adoption case law). Nevertheless, because wrongful adoption does not seek to terminate the parent-child relationship, it is a more suitable remedy for those victimized by the
misrepresentations of an adoption agency. John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption:
Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by
Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (1987).
35. 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). The facts in Burr serve to support the growing emphasis that is placed on the disclosure of an adopted child's medical and physical history. See
ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 219 (1978) (arguing that sealed
adoption records impede one's identity formation). See generally Claire Grandpre' Combs,
Note, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1987) (discussing facts in Burr). In particular, disclosure serves the adopter's right to make an informed decision. See Janet Hopkins Dickson,
Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 917, 944 (1991) (arguing that adoptive parents should be treated as biological parents).
Furthermore, the adoptee is also served by disclosure. See id. at 942 (noting that disclosure
allows adoptee to diagnose hereditary illness). Also, disclosure serves to benefit both the
adopted child and the adoptive parents by creating a better chance of a successful adoptive
relationship. See id. at 945 (noting adoptions more likely to fail when adoptive parents not
fully informed).
36. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1108 (awarding compensatory damages to adoptive parents
STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES
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Although the Burr decision lead to the development of a cause of action
for wrongful adoption, the court tempered its decision by stating that it did
not intend to make adoption agencies guarantors of the children they
place.3 7 Instead, the court's interpretation of wrongful adoption only permitted a suit based upon the fraudulent misrepresentations of an adoption
agency.3 8

2. Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Department of Adoptions
Two years after the Burr decision, in a case styled Michael J. v. County Of
Los Angeles, Department Of Adoptions, 9 the California Court of Appeals
followed Ohio's lead and recognized wrongful adoption as a cause of action
because of agency's fraudulent misrepresentations). The court's decision established wrongful
adoption as a legitimate cause of action. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging
Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 957 (1991). The
decision in Burr was groundbreaking because, although previous cases in the nation had similar factual situations, no court had seen fit to award monetary damages for fraud on the part of
an adoption agency. John R. Malley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a
SuperiorRemedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L.
REV. 709, 718 n.75 (1991). Compare County Dep't of Public Welfare v. Morningstar, 151
N.E.2d 150, 155 (Ind. App. 1958) (affirming annulment of adoption after adoptive parents
fraudulently induced into adoption) with Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165
Cal. Rptr. 370, 373-74 (Cal. App. 1980) (refusing to recognize cause of action for adoption
agency's negligent misrepresentations).
37. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (stating that mere failure to disclose risks discoverable
in child's background not actionable). This view appears to be based on the court's understanding that the adoption agency in question had a policy of not providing adoptive parents
with the personal history of the adopted child. John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption:
Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by
Adoption Fraud,20 IND. L. REV. 709, 722 (1987). Arguably, had a duty to disclose existed,
the court could have found the mere failure to meet such a duty actionable. Id. at 723. However, a later decision makes it clear that in Ohio, only fraud on the part of an adoption agency
establishes a wrongful adoption action. See Allen v. Children's Serv., 567 N.E.2d 1346, 1349
(Ohio App. 1990) (stating that only cause of action against adoption agency for material misrepresentations is fraud). Thus, the court clearly did not establish a negligence standard. See
Susan Kempf LeMay, Comment, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action,
27 J. FAM. L. 475, 478 (1989) (discussing court's decision to create cause of action only for
rare, fraudulent abuse by adoption agency).
38. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109. This continues to be the rule in Ohio. See Allen, 567
N.E.2d at 1349 (Ohio App. 1990) (finding no cause of action for adoption agency's breach of
agreement to provide "healthy" child). It is important to note that after the Burrs adopted
Patrick, the Ohio Legislature did much to aid adoptive parents in obtaining information about
an adoptee by encouraging the collection of data concerning the pertinent history of an
adoptee's biological parents. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12(D)(2),(3) (Baldwin 1991)
(requiring disclosure of pertinent history of biological parents); see also Timothy N. O'Connel,
Legislative Note, S. B. 340: Disclosure of Social and Medical History of the Biological Parents
of an Adopted Child, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 533, 534 (1979) (discussing amendments to Ohio
adoption statute).
39. 247 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. App. 1988).
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as well." The facts in MichaelJ., although not as shocking as those in Burr,
paint an equally sad picture of parents fraudulently induced into an adoption.4 Mary Trout adopted Michael in 1970.42 Unfortunately, Mary mistakenly believed that a large port wine stain covering Michael's face and
upper torso was merely a birthmark.4 3 Eleven years after the adoption,
Michael began to suffer seizures and, upon diagnosis, the "birthmark" was
discovered to be a manifestation of Sturge-Weber Syndrome, a congenital
nerve disorder which causes epilepsy. 4" Mary soon discovered that the
adoption agency knew that Michael's future health was questionable even at
the time of his adoption, and quite possibly concealed this fact
intentionally.45
The California Court of Appeals, although acknowledging a previous decision which barred any wrongful adoption suit based on an adoption
agency's negligent misrepresentations, 46 recognized an action against an

40. See id. at 512-13 (recognizing action against adoption agencies for intentional misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment). The Michael J. case allowed recovery for wrongful
adoption for the first time in California. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging
Rights ofAdoptive Parents:Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 958 (1991). A similar case based on the negligent misrepresentations of an adoption agency had previously failed
in the California courts. See Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370,
373-74 (Cal. App. 1980) (finding no liability for adoption agency's negligent
misrepresentation).
41. Compare Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ohio 1986)
(adoptive parents victimized by adoption fraud) with Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (adoption agency intentionally concealed pertinent medical history of adopted child).
42. Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
43. Id. Michael had been voluntarily relinquished for adoption by his natural mother.
Id. Because of the port wine stain, Michael had been classified as "hard-to-place" and as a
result of this classification, appeared on a television broadcast seeking to recruit adoptive parents. Id. It was this broadcast which led Mary Trout to eventually adopt Michael. Id.
44. Id. Sturge-Weber Syndrome is defined as "a congenital disorder marked by the presence of red stains on the face .... angiomas (blood vessel tumors) of the meninges [protective
envelope of the brain and spinal cord], calcification (deposits of calcium) of the structures
within the cranium, hemiplegia (paralysis affecting one side of the body), mental retardation,
etc." 2 J.E. SCHMIDT, M.D., ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER
§ E-63 (1991).
45. Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. A report made shortly after Michael's birth noted
that a medical examination had resulted in a doctor's refusal to make a definite prognosis. Id.
at 545. Expert testimony established that the medical examination should have diagnosed
Sturge-Weber Syndrome and recognized the potential for epilepsy. Id. at 506.
46. Id. at 511-13. The court felt bound by its prior decision in RichardP. that, on public
policy grounds, barred an action against an adoption agency for its negligent misrepresentations of an adopted child's health. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 512 (discussing public
policy rationale behind decision in Richard P.). In Richard P., the court ruled that holding
adoption agencies liable for negligent misrepresentations would place an unreasonable burden
on such agencies. Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 374. In reality, Richard P. was the first attempt in the nation to recover for wrongful adoption. Compare Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1103
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agency which intentionally misrepresents or fraudulently conceals the true
health of an adopted child.47 Although the court refused to develop a negli-

gence standard for wrongful adoption, its decision nevertheless advanced the
scope of the tort by recognizing a duty on the part of adoption agencies to
disclose the pertinent history of an adopted child.4" However, because the
California court limited liability to intentional rather than negligent acts of
misrepresentation, the apparent advances made by the decision are limited
by the possibility that an adoption agency could inadequately gather or disclose pertinent data and yet remain invulnerable to a wrongful adoption
lawsuit.49
3.

Meracle v. Children'sService Society of Wisconsin

In 1989, the next piece in the wrongful adoption puzzle was fit into place

by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.50 In Meracle v. Children'sService Society of Wisconsin,"' an adoption agency was, for the first time, held liable for
negligent misrepresentations concerning the health of an adopted child.52

(allowing recovery for fraudulent misrepresentations by adoption agency concerning pertinent
history of adopted child) with Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (barring recovery for negligent
misrepresentations by adoption agency concerning pertinent history of adopted child). Because the agency in Richard P. had negligently informed the adoptive parents of the child's
health, this case is easily distinguished from the fraudulent circumstances involved in Burr.
See Susan Kempf Lemay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J.
FAM. L. 475, 479 (1989) (noting that agency in Richard P. had negligently failed to inform
parents of potential health risks caused by premature birth).
47. Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513. Reminiscent of the Burr decision, the California
court was quick to qualify its decision stating that it was not imposing a duty on adoption
agencies to predict the future health of the children they place. Id. Rather, the court sought
only to acknowledge a cause of action for deliberate concealment or intentional misrepresentations that misleads adoptive parents. Id. The court determined that the adoption agency's
failure to disclose a physician's refusal to make a definite prognosis for Michael suggested such
a fraud. Id.
48. See id. (requiring full disclosure of facts material to existing or past conditions concerning health of adopted child). This decision is somewhat confusing in that at the time
Michael was adopted, California had no mandatory disclosure law. Janet Hopkins Dickson,
Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 917, 960 (1991). As such, the court apparently recognized a common law duty of disclosure that predated any statutory duty. Id.
49. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (making only intentional misrepresentation or
fraudulent concealment actionable). This reduced standard of liability potentially discourages
adoption agencies from making efforts to fully disclose pertinent information. Janet Hopkins
Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38
UCLA L. REV. 917, 961 (1991).
50. See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989)
(holding adoption agency liable for negligent misrepresentation of health of adopted child).
51. 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989).
52. Id. at 537. The Wisconsin court gave much deference to the California Court of
Appeals' decisions in Richard P. and Michael J. See id. at 536-37 (discussing the holdings of
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However, the significance
of this holding is shadowed by the apparent limits
53
decision.
of the court's
The Meracles adopted a three year old girl, Erin, in 1980. 4 Prior to the
adoption, the Meracles were informed that Erin had a family history of
Huntington's Disease."3 The Meracles were also informed that because
Erin's father had not tested positive for the disease there was no exceptional
risk of Erin developing the disease.56 Unfortunately, the Meracles later discovered that there was in fact no test available to determine if Erin's father
had inherited the disease." In 1984, Erin was diagnosed as having Huntington's Disease.5"
The Meracles sued the adoption agency for wrongful adoption basing
their action on the negligent misrepresentations of the agency's
caseworker.5 9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that liability exists for an
adoption agency which, after voluntarily choosing to provide a child's medical history and prognosis, negligently discharges that duty.' Thus, for the
Richard P. and Michael J.). In particular, the court echoed the primary concern of the Richard P. decision: Holding adoption agencies liable for negligent misrepresentations would expose them to unlimited liability. Id. at 537. Ultimately, the Wisconsin court determined that
their holding would not place an unreasonable burden on adoption agencies, but would instead
increase confidence in the adoption process. See id. (reasoning that immunity for adoption
agencies would erode public confidence).
53. Compare Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr.
504, 513 (Cal. App. 1988) (declining to find cause of action for negligent misrepresentation)
with Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537 (declining to find duty of disclosure). Because the Meracle
court refused to find a duty of disclosure, it in effect encourages adoption agencies to remain
silent concerning the pertinent history of an adopted child. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV.
917, 962 (1991).
54. Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 533. The Meracles contacted the Children's Service Society
of Wisconsin about adopting a child in 1977. Id. In 1979, the Meracles were informed by the
agency that a twenty-three month old girl was available for adoption. Id. Erin was placed
with the Meracles in late 1979 and the adoption was completed approximately thirteen months
later. Id.
55. Id. The agency's caseworker disclosed the fact that Erin's grandmother had died of
the disease. Id.
56. Id. The Meracles were informed that if one generation tested free from Huntington's
Disease, the next generation would also be free. Id. As such, the Meracles were led to believe
that because Erin's father had not tested positive for the disease, Erin was at no greater risk
than any other child for developing the disease. Id.
57. Id. This discovery came after the Meracles viewed a television news program and
their subsequent research confirmed this report. Id.
58. Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 533.
59. Id. It is important to note that the caseworker remembered discussing Huntington's
Disease but could not recall discussing the likelihood of Erin's developing the disease. Id.
60. Id. at 536. However, the court emphasized that no injury occurred until the Meracles
learned that Erin had developed Huntington's Disease. Id. As the court explained, only with
the discovery of Erin's condition could the Meracles demonstrate the reasonably certain future
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first time an adoption agency was held liable for negligent misrepresentations
which induced adoptive parents to proceed with an adoption. 6 Although
the court acknowledged concerns that its holding would place an excessive
burden on adoption agencies,62 it ultimately concluded that a negligence
standard would increase confidence in the adoption process.6" Notwithstanding the significance of the Meracle decision, the court limited the impact of its holding by stating that it was in no way placing a duty on
adoption agencies to disclose material facts concerning an adopted child's
health."4 As such, the Meracle decision encourages agencies to follow a
"policy of silence" under which only negligent or intentional misrepresentations are actionable and no action lies for nondisclosure.6 5

expenses they would incur as the result of relying on the agency's affirmative misrepresentation. Id.
61. Compare Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Serv., 165 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (Cal. App.
1980) (refusing to hold agency liable for negligent misrepresentation) with Meracle, 437
N.W.2d at 537 (holding adoption agency liable for negligent misrepresentation).
62. See Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 536-37 (discussing public policy arguments for immunizing adoption agencies from liability).
63. Id. The court determined that because the adoption agency had assumed the affirmative duty of informing the Meracles of their child's risk of developing Huntington's Disease, it
had a responsibility to perform that duty in a reasonable manner. Id. The court based this
decision on the understanding that by holding agencies liable for negligently false representations, it was necessarily assuring the accuracy of the information that would be provided to
adoptive parents. Id.
64. Id. at 537. The court further appeased concerns about the burden being placed on
adoption agencies by stating that agencies could avoid liability by simply refusing to make any
affirmative representations concerning an adoptee's health. Id. This analysis is at odds with
circumstances that prompt a wrongful adoption suit, the denial of the opportunity to make an
informed decision to adopt a child. See Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (finding agency's
concealment deprived adoptive parents of opportunity to inquire further); see also Burr,
N.E.2d at 1109 (misleading adoptive parents determined to be cause of compensable injuries).
As such, allowing an agency to simply refuse to disclose any information serves only to insulate poorly run adoption agencies and maintain the vulnerable status of adoptive parents. Cf
Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L. REV.
2017, 2023 (1987) (discussing purpose of wrongful birth cause of action).
65. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 962 (1991) (contending that under Meracle,
agencies are not responsible if nothing is said concerning pertinent history of adopted child).
A possible reason for this outcome may have been the public policy considerations expressed in
other jurisdictions. See Richard P., 165 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (stating that negligence standard
would impede proper functioning of agencies). Similar considerations may have been a factor
in a prior wrongful adoption decision. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (finding no cause of
action for failure to disclose). However this holding may have been based on the court's recognition that no statutory duty of disclosure existed at the time of the decision. See Claire
Grandpre' Combs, Note, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 343, 354 (1987) (arguing that Burr relied on lack
of statutory duty in not imposing duty of disclosure).
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B. Analysis of Case Law
It is ironic that the three cases responsible for the creation and expansion
of wrongful adoption jurisprudence also demonstrate potential inadequacies
remaining with this developing tort." With each new decision, the scope of
liability for wrongful adoption has increased, from intentional fraud to negligence.67 However, this expansion is deceptive since both Burr and Michael
J. refused to impose any liability for negligent misrepresentations 6 and Meracle, although creating a negligence standard, refused to impose any duty on
adoption agencies to disclose relevant information. 69 The disappointing result of these decisions is that under the common law adoptive parents have
no absolute right to receive the information they desperately need in deciding to adopt a child.7 °
66. See, e.g., Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr.
504, 513 (Cal. App. 1988) (imposing duty of disclosure with no negligence standard); Burr v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986) (finding liability for fraud with
no duty to disclose); Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis.
1989) (imposing negligence standard with no duty of disclosure). Although the rights of adoptive parents have been greatly improved by this series of decisions, the impact on the adoption
process as a whole may be less than positive. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The
Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REv. 917, 963 (1991)
(arguing that no jurisdiction is willing to create absolute right to know adopted child's history). As is the case with any developing area of law, these inadequacies may be corrected in
time. Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause ofAction, 27 J.
FAM. L. 475, 475 (1989).
67. See, e.g., Michael J., 247 Cal. Rptr. at 513 (imposing liability for negligent concealment); Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109 (imposing liability for intentional fraud); Meracle, 437
N.W.2d at 537 (imposing negligence standard). Thus, the tort of wrongful adoption appears to
be expanding. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights ofAdoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 962 (1991). However, similar cases indicate
that courts continue to show resistance to expanding the application of wrongful adoption. See
Allen v. Children's Serv., 567 N.E.2d 1346, 1349 (Ohio App. 1990) (refusing to find adoption
agency liable for breach of contract to provide "healthy" baby); see also Foster by Foster v.
Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 978-79 (Miss. 1990) (reasoning that adoption agency could not reasonably foresee physicians' failure to test adoptee for PKU).
68. Compare MichaelJ., 437 N.W.2d at 537 (imposing no duty of disclosure) with Burr,
491 N.E.2d at 1109 (imposing duty only for fraud). Furthermore, recent case law, although
acknowledging a negligence standard, also falls short of fully developing the tort. See Foster,
575 So. 2d at 982 (refusing to hold adoption agency liable for hospital's negligence).
69. Meracle, 437 N.W.2d at 537 (imposing no duty of disclosure).
70. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 962-63 (1991) (discussing limitations in decisions which have developed wrongful adoption).
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IV.

A.

DEVELOPING WRONGFUL ADOPTION IN TEXAS

ProposedDuty and Standard of Liability

As the small amount of case law dealing with wrongful adoption indicates,
the tort is young and inadequacies remain in its application. Accordingly,
Texas has the opportunity to further develop this relatively new cause of
action. This development should impose a duty on adoption agencies to disclose the pertinent history of an adoptee. 7 1 Absent such a duty, adoption
agencies will choose to remain silent and thus avoid any potential liability.72

71. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 964 (1991) (calling for duty of good faith disclosure of pertinent history of adopted child). The absence of such a duty may rob the adoptee of
vital information. See Ann T. Lamport, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial Insemination, and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 112 (1988) (explaining that adoption files may be only source of medical information for adoptee). Similarly, nondisclosure
serves as an injustice to the adoptive parents by denying them the relevant information they
need to make an informed decision to adopt a child. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 184 (1989) (noting considerable number of children with hidden "special needs").
Besides these strong arguments in favor of disclosure, the relationship between the adoptive
parents and the adoption agency may in itself be sufficient to warrant disclosure. See John R.
Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 723-24 (1987)
(arguing that fiduciary relationship creates duty of disclosure). Under such a fiduciary relationship, analogous to that between a seller and purchaser, "material information that is not
discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence must be disclosed." See W. Page
Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6 (1953) (discussing duty of
disclosure in purchase transaction). Furthermore, the fact that a policy of nondisclosure in an
adoption transaction is potentially unethical may be grounds enough to disallow it. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 739 (5th ed.
1984) (noting trend to find duty of disclosure based on standard of ethical person). Ultimately,
a policy of disclosure serves the adoptee's best interest and should not be too difficult to impose
since most adoption agencies claim to do so already. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 174 (1989) (surveying risks and benefits of various methods of adoption). Any
increased cost in the adoption process for this benefit could feasibly be passed to the adopters.
See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 16.032 (k) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (authorizing payment of reasonable cost for report).
72. See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989) (explaining that absent duty of disclosure, adoption agency need only avoid making affirmative
representations to avoid liability). The result is that adoption agencies who are not required to
disclose the relevant history of an adoptee will follow a "policy of silence" under which they
will avoid liability by providing no information at all to adoptive parents. See Burr v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1108 (Ohio 1986) (finding liability based on affirmative
misrepresentations, not on policy of silence). This marks a return to the outdated secretive
practices once used by adoption agencies. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging
Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 962 (1991). This is
in contrast to the growing movement towards openness in the adoption process. See NA-
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Furthermore, adoption agencies which negligently discharge this duty
should be held liable for the injuries resulting from their misconduct. 3
Although these advances are essential to the proper development of
wrongful adoption, this proposal should in no way be taken as requiring
adoption agencies to become guarantors of the children they place. Conditions such as the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) 74 and fetal
alcohol syndrome7 5 can be impossible to detect.76 Placing a burden on

TIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES,

REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 111 (1989) (discussing development of "open" or "experimental" adoption). Although this retreat into the practices of the past may not be disastrous,
see id. (expressing concern over lack of scientific evaluation of open adoption), it is recognized
that the availability of information can be of aid to the adopted child. See ARTHUR D.
SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 221-24 (1978) (arguing that lack of background
information inhibits development of adoptee's sense of identity).
73. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 107, at 745 (5th ed. 1984) (misrepresentation involving non-disclosure indistinguishable from
other forms of negligence).
No doubt virtually all courts today would recognize the existence of some situations
where the nature of a representor's activity or a pre-existing relationship between the
representor and the representee, or the two factors together, will constitute the basis for
the imposition of a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid harm from reasonable and
expectable reliance on what is said about certain matters related to the subject matter of
the transaction.
Id. at 746. As such, a misrepresentation, although believed to be true, may still be negligent
due to the representor's unreasonable lack of care in determining the truth of the matter asserted. Id. at 745.
74. AIDS, a syndrome having a high rate of mortality, results in a suppressed immunity
mechanism which increases the susceptibility to a number of diseases. 1 J.E. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER § A-138 (1991).

75. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, the result of a mother's consumption of alcohol during
pregnancy, is the primary cause of mental retardation in the United States. L. Rachel Eisenstein, PrenatalHealth Care: Today's Solution to the Future'sLoss, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 467,
471 (1991). The condition is characterized by disorders in the central nervous system, growth
deficiencies, and other abnormalities and malformations. Of the three leading causes of mental
retardation, fetal alcohol syndrome is the only preventable cause. Id.

76. See

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION,

ADOPTION FACTBOOK,

UNITED

STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 130-31 (1989) (discussing impact of
AIDS on adoption process). Although the number of pediatric (children under age 13) AIDS

cases is relatively small, the virus cannot be detected in infants until they are 15 months old.
Subsequent tests may then show no sign of the virus. This problem is further complicated by
the fact that approximately one-third of babies infected with the AIDS virus will be abandoned
and become probable candidates for adoption. Id. Similarly, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome is not
always present at birth. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The EmergingRights of Adoptive
Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 963 n.246 (1991). Other conditions
such as mental retardation and congenital malformations manifest themselves in the children
of incest. See Ann T. Lamport, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial Insemination,
and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 114 (1988) (encouraging the evaluation of
children from incest prior to adoption). The risk of a child developing these conditions is
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adoption agencies to bear the unforeseeable risk of a child developing such
conditions would be unreasonable and disastrous.77 Rather, this proposal
simply advances the realization that, "just as couples must weigh the risks of
becoming natural parents, taking into consideration a host of factors, so too
should adoptive parents be allowed to make their decision in an intelligent
78
manner."
B.

Griffith v. Johnston: Adoption and the Constitution

With an understanding of what the appropriate standard of liability
should be for wrongful adoption, it is essential to determine the applicability
of that standard in Texas. As was recently made clear by the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Griffith v. Johnston,7 9 the conditions are

unpredictable because most women placing such children for adoption do not report the identity of the father. Id.
77. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 963 (1991) (advocating liability only for conditions reasonably foreseeable at time of adoptee's placement). Where an adopted child develops
some condition which could not have been predicted, the adoption agency should be excused
from any liability under the concept of "unavoidable accident." See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 29, at 162 (5th ed. 1984) (defining
unavoidable accident as event not proximately caused by negligence of party to event). Making an adoption agency guarantee every act it takes would be an intolerable burden. Id. at 163.
If no foresight could prevent the outcome, an agency cannot be blamed. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 92 (Little, Brown & Co. 1881) (discussing application of unavoidable accident). Although it may be unavoidable that an adopted child will
develop some undetectable condition, the agency still must have a duty to warn all adoptive
parents of such risk. See Ann T. Lamport, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, Artificial
Insemination, and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 114 (1988) (emphasizing
disclosure of incest related defects to adoptive parents). With such information it will then be
the adoptive parents' option to risk that the adopted child has unforeseen impairment. See
Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or
Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 964 (1991) (discussing appropriate standard of liability for
wrongful adoption). Without such a policy, it would be the absence of a warning which causes
an injury to the adoptive parents, not the child's undetectable defect. Cf. Marsha Ternus
Rundall, Note, "Act of God" as a Defense in Negligence Cases, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 754, 757
(1976) (explaining necessity of proximate cause in unavoidable accident defense).
78. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1109. In this respect, a wrongful adoption action should be
analogous to a wrongful birth lawsuit. See Susan Kempf Lemay, The Emergence of Wrongful
Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 487 (1988-89) (analogizing wrongful adoption to wrongful birth). Wrongful birth is an action by natural parents against a physician for
negligent genetic counseling which denies them the opportunity to abort an impaired child.
Thomas DeWitt Rogers, III, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpracticein Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C. L. REv. 713, 740-41 (1982).
,

79. 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 904 F.2d 705, and cert. denied, Il S. Ct. 712, 112 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1991).
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ripe for Texas to recognize wrongful adoption as a cause of action.8 0
Over a six-year period, the Griffiths adopted five "hard-to-place" or "special needs" children through the Texas Department of Human Services
(TDHS).8 ' The extent of these special needs became apparent when, during
their adolescence, the children attacked their parents and siblings with lethal
weapons, destroyed property, and committed other criminal acts within the
2
community.8

Although the Griffiths were informed of the special classifications of their
adopted children, they claimed that TDHS had in fact taken measures to
avoid discovering the extent of the children's problems, thereby avoiding the
necessity to communicate such information to the Griffiths. 3 In particular,
the Griffiths alleged that TDHS had withheld facts concerning the extent
that their children were physically, sexually, or emotionally abused; facts
concerning mental and physical handicaps; and other vital information concerning the children's family histories.8 4 The Griffiths further alleged that
this concealment was part of TDHS' policy to encourage the adoption of
hard-to-place and special needs children." Believing that they were so induced, the Griffiths claimed that they were injured because they were denied
the opportunity to make an informed decision whether or not to adopt.8 6

80. See id. at 1435-36 (noting appropriateness of tort claim against adoption agency
under circumstances resembling wrongful adoption claim).
81. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1433. The terms "hard-to-place" or "special needs" describe
children that are difficult to place in adoptive homes for various reasons such as age, race,
handicap, or being a member of a sibling group. TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 47.001
(Vernon 1990). Texas operates a special program designed to promote the adoption of such
children. Id. § 47.002. Within this classification are children that are difficult to place due to a
number of reasons including age, race, ethnicity, language, handicap, or being a member of a
group of siblings who should be adopted together. Id. § 47.001. The program encourages the
adoption of such children by providing information, financial assistance, and post-adoption
services. Id. §§ 47.003, 47.004, 47.031, 47.032. These programs are furthered with aid from
the federal government. See Adoption Opportunities Program, 42 U.S.C. § 5111 (1978) (providing grants to non-profit programs promoting adoption of special needs children); see also
The Adoption Assistance Program, 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1980) (reimbursing state subsidies made
for special needs adoptions).
82. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1434. A number of the children were eventually institutionalized. Id.
83. Id. at 1433-34. In particular, the Griffiths alleged that TDHS failed to hire necessary
personnel who could competently handle the children's peculiar problems. Id. Furthermore,
the Griffiths alleged that psychologists employed by TDHS were not "competent to learn and
communicate the information essential for parents to make informed adoption decisions." Id.
84. Id. at 1434.
85. Id. The Griffiths alleged that TDHS followed this policy despite Texas statutes which
require disclosure of the pertinent history of an adoptee. Id.
86. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1434. As a result of making this uninformed decision, the Griffiths claimed that not only did they incur unforeseen expenses caring for their children, but
also the children were injured because of delays in such treatment. Id.
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Although the Griffiths' allegations fit within the mold of previous wrongful adoption actions, they based their lawsuit not in state tort law, but instead on the provisions of the United States Constitution.87 Thus, the case

dealt exclusively with federal questions.8 " The Griffiths alleged that the actions of TDHS deprived them of their "fundamental right" to make an informed decision about adoption and therefore violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 In examining the validity of this
claim, the court acknowledged that under the Civil Rights Act, Title 42,
Section 1983, one is entitled to recover for Due Process Clause violations
made under color of state law, as had possibly occurred to the Griffiths
under Texas adoption laws.' However, the court was quick to state that
both the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have established
that for a due process violation to exist, one must first have a recognized
"liberty or property" interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.9 1 In determining whether the Griffiths had established such an interest, the court
noted that the Supreme Court, although having expanded the definition of

"liberty" to include interests not specifically stated by the Constitution,9 2

87. See id. at 1432 (basing claim on alleged 14th Amendment violations). Despite the
Griffiths' due process and equal protection allegations, their claims resemble those of a wrongful adoption cause of action. Compare Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1433-34 (alleging intentional misrepresentation of condition of adopted children) with Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491
N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (Ohio 1986) (alleging fraud in adoption process); see also NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA,

ISSUES, REGULA-

AND RESOURCES 132 (1989) (defining wrongful adoption as misrepresentation of
condition of child which denies adoptive parents opportunity to make informed decision to
adopt).
88. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1435-36. Even so, the court made it a point to note the tort-like
qualities of the Griffiths' claim. Id.
89. Id. at 1437. Specifically, the Griffiths alleged that the actions of TDHS amounted to
governmental interference with their "fundamental interest" in making an "informed" decision to adopt. Id. The Griffith children also advanced a due process claim based on their
interest in the "uninhibited development of their personalities" and an "interest in living in
non-restrictive circumstances." Id. at 1438. The court determined that these interests were
insufficient for constitutional protection. Id. at 1440. Similarly, the children claimed that the
TDHS adoption program violated their equal protection rights by providing greater care for
children in state custody than to children, like themselves, who are in private custody. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1441. These claims were also denied based on a determination that the interests advanced did not warrant constitutional protection. Id. at 1440-41.
90. Id. at 1435. The court's analysis is well founded in both United States Supreme Court
and Fifth Circuit decisions. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (denying relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for negligent deprivation of liberty interest); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) (finding negligence on part of prison official insufficient
to qualify as due process violation); Brantley v. Surles, 718 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (1983) (acknowledging parental right to choose child's school).
91. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1435.
92. Id.
TIONS
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had also encouraged courts to keep the Fourteenth Amendment's reach
within those rights deemed to be fundamental.9 3 With this in mind, the
court reasoned that neither previous Supreme Court decisions nor current
analysis would justify the recognition of a fundamental right to adopt.9 4
Furthermore, the court recognized that the Griffiths did not necessarily seek
to establish a fundamental right to adopt, but rather were asserting a right
to informed decision-making which had been denied when the state withheld
information.9" However, the court reasoned that a claim that TDHS should
have given more information before and after adoption was unfounded because the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation on
states to protect life, liberty, and property, but is instead a limitation on the
states' power to deprive such interests.96 Therefore, the court determined
that the Griffiths had presented no liberty interest which was deprived by the
state and as such could not recover under the Fourteenth Amendment for
97
any concealment of information by TDHS.
1. The Implications of Griffith
Despite the Fifth Circuit's decision that adoptive parents have no constitutional right to receive the pertinent history of an adopted child, the court's
decision is in no way a limitation on the validity of wrongful adoption in
Texas. The court made it a point to establish that although the Griffiths'

93. Id. This point is supported by recent United States Supreme Court decisions. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-23 (1989) (limiting reach of Due Process Clause to
interests traditionally protected by society); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96
(1986) (refusing Due Process Clause protection of homosexual sodomy).
94. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1437. The court explained that an opposite decision would create a conflict between the adoptive parents' fundamental right to adopt and the biological
parents' right to privacy, a balancing of interests it chose not to perform. Id.
95. Id. The Griffiths argued that although the state could possibly regulate the "right to
adopt" initially, it should be prevented from causing subsequent interference by providing incomplete information about an adoptee. Id.
96. Id. at 1438. This decision is supported by a number of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 491 U.S. 490, 509 (1989)
(finding no Due Process Clause violation in state's use of public facilities to encourage childbirth over abortion); DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS, 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (explaining that Due Process Clause contains no requirement that state protect its citizens from private
invasion of interests); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982) (requiring training of
involuntarily committed, retarded individual to protect his liberty interest in freedom from
restraint).
97. Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1438. The court rationalized this decision on the basis that if it
were to find the state's conduct to be a due process violation, it would not establish any clear
standards for a what would qualify as a "constitutional" adoption program. Id. The Griffiths
also asserted a claim that because the state provided inadequate care for their children, they
were deprived of a property interest in the funds they had to spend on necessary treatment. Id.
at 1440. This claim also failed under the court's analysis. Id. at 1440-41.
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claim was valid, they had simply brought the wrong cause of action.9" The
court repeatedly stressed that the Griffiths' claim would have been proper

under Texas tort law, emphasizing this point by stating that its decision

should not be read to preclude such a claim. 99 Accordingly, Griffith stands
not as a disparagement of the validity of wrongful adoption in Texas, but

rather as an argument for recognition of the tort.
C.

Texas Adoption Law: The Duty of Disclosure

One reason for the delayed recognition of wrongful adoption in Texas is
the state's adoption process which takes steps towards preventing the cir-

cumstances that have led to wrongful adoption lawsuits in other states. 1 °

The adoption process in Texas comes under the jurisdictional umbrella of

the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS).' 0 ' As such, any adop-

tion agency operating within the state is subject to a number of provisions
designed to guarantee effective and appropriate operation.' °2 TDHS also
holds dominion over children who have become wards of the state because
neglect or delinquency necessitated the termination of a natural parent-child
relationship.' °3 Ultimately, the state can authorize the adoption of these
children under its control.104
The common thread linking all Texas adoption programs is a mandatory
disclosure provision, Section 16.032 of the Texas Family Code, which requires that adoption agencies provide the pertinent history of an adopted
child.105 Mandatory disclosure provisions are not uncommon within the

98. See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1436 (5th Cir. 1990), reh 'g denied, 904 F.2d
705, and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 712, 112 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1991) (emphasizing tortlike nature of claim).
99. See id. at 1441 (expressing no opinion on merits of claim brought under state law).
100. See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1436 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 904 F.2d
705, and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 712, 112 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1991) (noting extensive
statutory safeguards provided by Texas adoption process).
101. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001, 42.002 (12), 42.021(a) (Vernon 1990)
(placing adoption agencies within jurisdiction of Department of Human Services).
102. See, e.g., TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 42.041, 42.049, 42.051, 42.052 (Vernon
1990) (requiring licensing and certification of adoption agencies); id. § 42.043 (setting rules for
immunizations); id. §§ 42.071, 42.076 (establishing sanctions for noncompliance).
103. See TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a) (Vernon 1990) (providing for enforcement of laws protecting dependent, neglected children). After such children come under the
state's control, TDHS can seek to terminate the natural parent-child relationship and become
their managing conservator. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.02(a) (Vernon 1986), 15.02
(Vernon Supp. 1992). As the managing conservator of such children, the state must provide
for their welfare. Id. §§ 14.02, 15.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
104. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.02(b)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (giving managing conservator right to consent to child's adoption upon termination of parent-child relationship).
105. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (requiring production of
report containing pertinent history of adoptee prior to adoption). Had such a provision been
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United States." °6 However, Section 16.032 is one of the most comprehensive
provisions in the nation 10 7 and provides in part:
Before placing a child for adoption with any person other than the
child's stepparent, aunt, or uncle by birth, marriage or prior adoption,
the Texas Department of Human Services, an authorized agency, or the
child's parent or guardian shall compile a report on the available health,
social, educational, and genetic history of the child to be adopted.108
As is common to other provisions across the nation, Section 16.032 provides for the disclosure of the health and genetic history of a child." ° Unin place under the circumstances that led to past wrongful adoption suits, such conflicts may
have been avoided. See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis.
1989) (imposing no liability for nondisclosure); see also Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491
N.E.2d 1101, 1109 (Ohio 1986) (basing liability on intentional misrepresentation, not failure to
disclose). But see Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr.
504, 513 (Cal. App. 1988) (mandating full disclosure of facts concerning adoptee's health).
106. At least twenty-one states have provisions requiring disclosure prior to the adoption.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE

§ 26-1OA-19

(1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 8-129

(1989); ARK.

STAT. ANN. §§ 9-9-501(8), 9-9-505 (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 222.26, 224.70 (Deering Supp.
1992); FLA. STAT. §§ 63.082(3)(b), 63.162(1)(O (West Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-

2 (Burns Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE § 600.81(l)(c) (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19 § 533 (West Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.27, 710.68 (West Supp.
1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-8-109, 40-8-122 (Supp. 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-128,
43-146 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-46 (1989);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15.1-04
(Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.12 (Baldwin 1988); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2102, 2909 (Purdon 1991); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (Vernon Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-223 (Michie Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.350 (West
Supp. 1992); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-6 (1992). Similarly, a number of states require disclosure of
information regarding the biological parents of an adopted child, but not the child himself.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-746 (West Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 57814.5 (Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1522.4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.422.13 (West
Supp. 1991); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-328 (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. 48-25 (d), (e)
(1991). A third group of states provide for disclosure but do not make this requirement until
the adoption is finalized. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-30-16, 78-30-17 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.93 (West Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 122-116 (1988). Although the provisions established in this last group of states give the adoptive parents information essential to them in their duties as parents, they do not acknowledge

any right of adoptive parents to make an informed decision concerning adoption. See Janet
Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The EmergingRights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?,
38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 953 (1991) (discussing weaknesses in various disclosure provisions).
107. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 952 n.191 (1991).
108. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a), (b), (e) (Vernon Supp. 1992). The absence of
this information has the obvious result that an adopted child's impairment may go undetected
or, if detected, impossible to diagnose. See Ann T. Lamport, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adop-
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like other provisions however, the Texas statute explicitly requires that
adoptive parents be provided with information concerning any prior emotional, sexual, or physical abuse suffered by an adopted child, as well as any
data concerning previous attempts to place the child in an adoptive home."11

Also, the provision makes an important distinction between the information
provided to those who adopt a newborn and those who adopt an older
child."' Furthermore, Section 16.032 is particularly well drafted because it
recognizes three relevant purposes for disclosure. First, the provision requires that a detailed report be provided to adoptive parents prior to the
finalization of adoption, thus ensuring an informed decision." 2 Second, it
allows for the review of an adopted child's record after an adoption is finalized, thus assisting in the parenting of the child." 3 Finally, it guarantees
that the adopted child is benefited directly by allowing adult adoptees to
recover relevant information concerning their history, thus allowing them to
better predict any future complications they may suffer." 4
1. Analysis of Texas Adoption Law: Inadequacies in the System
Notwithstanding the protection granted adoptive parents under Texas

tion, ArtificialInsemination,and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 113-14 (198889) (discussing inability to diagnose illness of adoptee absent complete genetic pedigree).
110. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992). See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The EmergingRights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 917, 952 (1991) (noting comprehensiveness of Texas statute). By acknowledging the
importance of the background of these "orphans of the living," the Texas statute does much to
assist in creating a lasting, beneficial placement. See ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE
ADOPTION TRIANGLE 199 (1978) (encouraging careful, sensitive planning in adoption of older,
experienced children).
111. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (providing for disclosure of child's scholastic performance if applicable). Such a distinction is essential because it
acknowledges that events in a child's history may have significant repercussions in the future.
See Andrea Sachs, When the Lullaby Ends: Should Adoptive Parents Be Able to Return Unwanted Children?, TIME, June 1990, at 82 (noting greater success rate in adoption of children
under two). For example, 2% of adoptions in America fail. Id. Of these, only 10% involved
the adoption of a child under 2 years old. Id. However, for the ages between 12 and 17, the
rate increases to 24%. Id.
112. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(f) (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The EmergingRights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L.
REV. 917, 953 (1991) (arguing that disclosure prior to finalization of adoption is essential to
adoptive parents' interests in making informed decision to adopt).
113. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(n) (Vernon Supp. 1992). The statute also provides
for the supplementing of an adoptee's report as information becomes available. Id. § 16.032(l).
114. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(i)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (providing for disclosure to adoptee upon majority). This may be an invaluable gift to the adoptee. See Ann T.
Lamport, Note, The Genetics of Secrecy in Adoption, ArtificialInsemination, and In Vitro Fertilization, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 112 (1988) (noting that adoption records may be only
source of adoptee's medical history).
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adoption law, two key inadequacies remain. First, Texas requires only the
disclosure of "known" or "available" information concerning the
adoptee.' 1 5 Although this language may represent an understanding on the
part of the provision's framers that some information about a child placed
for adoption is simply unavailable, it leaves room for subjectivity and noncompliance. 1 6 The second weakness with the Texas adoption process is
critical: few meaningful remedies are available to adoptive parents who have
been injured in the adoption process." 7 Absent the possibility of bringing a
cause of action for wrongful adoption, the only other possible remedy avail-

able is an annulment of the adoption."

8

However this remedy has at least

two significant weaknesses: 1) a short limitations period may deny adoptive

115. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 16.032(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (requiring report

of only "available" information); see also id. § 16.032(c), (d), (e) (limiting disclosure to extent
information is "known"). Although requiring a disclosure of known information indicates
progress, absent a duty to affirmatively discover the pertinent history of an adopted child, a
"policy of silence" remains probable. See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437
N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989) (allowing adoption agencies to avoid liability by not making
affirmative representations about child's health).
116. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 951 (1991) (discussing weaknesses in California
disclosure provision). For example, a caseworker who suspects a problem may exist with a
potential adoptee could intentionally avoid discovering the problem, yet still remain within the
boundaries of the law. Id. at 951-52. Further potential for subjectivity under the Texas provision is present because, if an adoptee's parents cannot be found, a genetic history report may
not be generated despite the availability of relevant information. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 16.032(m) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (allowing waiver of report where insufficient information
available due to inability to locate adoptee's biological parents).
117. See TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 42.071, 42.072, 42.073, 42.074, 42.075, 42.076
(Vernon 1990) (penalties focus on punishing adoption facilities for noncompliance, not on
compensating adoptive parents). This weakness has been recognized by the courts as well. See
Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1436 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 904 F.2d 705, and cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 712, 112 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1991) (acknowledging tort action as
potential remedy). Furthermore, individuals are penalized minimally if at all. See TEX. HUM.
RES. CODE ANN. § 42.075(a)(1) (Vernon 1990) (providing for civil penalty between $50 and
$100 per day of violation); see also id. § 42.076 (imposing criminal penalty only for unlicensed
operation and unauthorized advertisement of agency); see also Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV.
917, 954 (1991) (noting possible immunity for individuals responsible for agency's noncompliance). Admittedly, counsel for adoptive parents would demand compliance with disclosure
provisions. John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior
Remedy for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud,20 IND. L. REV. 709, 733 (1987).
Nevertheless, complete disclosure laws should provide meaningful sanctions for noncompliance. Id.
118. See Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 480-82 (1989) (explaining limitations on and disfavor annulment alternative); see also John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a
Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L.
REV. 709, 715 (1987) (noting trend in state legislatures to disallow annulment).
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parents any recourse,11 9 and 2) in most cases, a termination of the parentchild relationship is the last thing any party to the action wants. 2 ° Thus,
the only legitimate recourse that may be available to adoptive parents who

are not given the information 12
they
need to make an informed decision is an
1
action for wrongful adoption.
D. Imposing a Negligence Standardfor Wrongful Adoption in Texas
Although it seems clear that a negligence standard is justified for an adoption agency's failure to disclose the pertinent history of an adoptee, 122 sufficient bases must exist to support the imposition of such a standard. A
negligence standard can be justified for two reasons: 1) analogous causes of

119. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.12 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (adoption decree subject to
attack only for two years after entered). The deception caused by an adoption agency's fraudulent or negligent conduct may go undiscovered for a period of time well over the two year
limitation. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1103-04 (Ohio 1986)
(agency's fraudulent conduct not discovered for some 18 years). Thus, adoptive parents may
discover an agency's deception and at the same time discover that they have no remedy. See
John R. Malley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to
Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 717-18
(1987) (explaining unlikelihood of adoptive parents asking themselves of remedy where fraud
is involved).
120. See Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 483 (1989) (discussing faults inherent in annulment alternative). Furthermore, because the best interests of the child must always be considered, an otherwise valid
annulment may be denied if the annulment would not benefit the child's welfare. See Anne
Harlan Howard, Note, Annulment of Adoption Decrees on Petition of Adoptive Parents, 22 J.
FAM. L. 549, 562 (1984) (explaining courts' unwillingness to annul adoption when best interest
of child not served). It should also be noted that annulment has at least one other fault:
although an annulment may inconvenience an adoption agency, it does not serve as a deterrent
to prevent an agency's future tortious conduct. John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption:
Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by
Adoption Fraud,20 IND. L. REV. 709, 718 (1987).
121. See Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1436 (noting applicability of tort law to facts resembling
wrongful adoption). Allowing adoptive parents to recover the compensatory damages they
have endured because of the unexpected cost of raising an impaired child allows them to keep
their family intact and still recover for their injuries. John R. Malley, Comment, Wrongful
Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulmentfor Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud,20 IND. L. REV. 709, 729 (1987).
122. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 964 (1991) (proposing negligence standard for
wrongful adoption). Such a standard is of course premised upon a duty of disclosure. See
John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to
Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 723
(1987) (discussing various bases for imposing duty of disclosure). This duty of disclosure is
clearly established in Texas under statutory law. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1992) (requiring disclosure of adoptee's pertinent history).
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action within the state have imposed such a standard; and 2) violation of the
state's disclosure statute establishes negligence per se.
1. The Wrongful Birth Analogy
Compensating individuals who have been denied the opportunity to make
a fully informed decision as to whether or not they shall be parents is not a
novel idea in Texas. 12 3 In 1975, the Supreme Court of Texas in Jacobs v.
Theimer,124 recognized a cause of action for natural parents who, due to a
physician's negligence, are denied the opportunity to make an informed decision whether or not to abort the birth of a seriously handicapped child.125 A
cause of action for wrongful birth was thus recognized for the first time in
the nation.' 26 The tort has subsequently achieved general acceptance.' 27

123. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring)
(acknowledging legitimacy of suit based on physician's negligent prenatal advice); see also Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975) (establishing cause of action for physician's
negligent prenatal advice).
124. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
125. Id. at 848. In Jacobs, a physician informed Mrs. Jacobs of her pregnancy but was
negligent in failing to diagnose rubella. Id. at 847. As a result of the doctor's negligent diagnosis, the Jacobs' child was born with rubella and had to undergo a number of costly operations. Id. Jacobs was a particularly unique decision in that it recognized that the Jacobs had
been denied the opportunity to abort their troubled child even though at that time abortions
were allowed in Texas only to save the life of the mother. See id. at 847-48 (explaining that
decision whether to abort or not should have been made by plaintiffs). It is this denial that is
the gravamen of a wrongful birth action. Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful
Adoption as a Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 487 (1989).
126. James M. Parker, Jr., Comment, Wrongful Life: The Child's Cause of Action for
Negligent Genetic Counseling in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 663 (1985). Wrongful birth is
related to two similar causes of action, wrongful life and wrongful pregnancy, which is also
known as wrongful conception. See Benjamin Lee Locklar, Comment, Jackson v. Bumgardner: A Healthy Newborn-A Blessing or a Curse?, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 153, 153-54 (1988)
(noting that these terms are used interchangeably in some jurisdictions). However, these terms
represent three distinct causes of action. See Teddy Lee Mann, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages Recoverablefor the Birth of a Normal, Healthy Child, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoc. 385, 38586 (1984) (distinguishing the three causes of action). Wrongful birth is recognized as an action
brought by the parents of a child born with birth defects against a physician who failed to
inform them that their unborn child was at risk for such defects, thereby denying the parents
the option to abort the pregnancy. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D.S.C.
1981). Wrongful life is a cause of action brought by or on behalf of a child born with birth
defects against a physician who failed to inform his parents of the risk of such defects, thereby
denying the parents the option of aborting the pregnancy. Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 547
(Ala. 1978). Wrongful pregnancy, also known as wrongful conception, is a cause of action
brought by the parents of a healthy, yet unwanted, child to recover against a physician who
negligently performed a sterilization operation. Schark v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky.
1983). Wrongful life is not recognized as a cause of action in Texas. See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at
925 (allowing wrongful birth, denying wrongful life). Similarly, Texas courts have refused to
allow recovery for wrongful pregnancy. See, e.g., Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 870
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Recognizing the magnitude of the decision to become parents, courts in
Texas have been very willing to impose a duty on physicians to disclose pertinent information to prospective parents concerning the potential complications their child may face.12 Physicians who fail to discharge this duty in a

(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding no damage in birth of healthy child);
Sutkin v. Beck, 629 S.W.2d 131, 131-32 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding
benefit of healthy child outweighs economic loss); Silva v. Howe, 608 S.W.2d 840, 842 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that regardless of statute of limitations bar on claim, no recovery for wrongful birth); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 127-28
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (finding wrongful birth action barred by
public policy). Wrongful pregnancy is generally denied because courts recognize that the costs
of raising a defective child are outweighed by the benefit of having any child regardless of birth
defects. See Hickman, 632 S.W.2d at 870 (finding benefits of parenthood exceed monetary
burden). Recovery has also been denied for wrongful pregnancy based on public sentiment
which disfavors abortion and contraception. Teddy Lee Mann, Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages Recoverable for the Birth of a Normal, Healthy Child, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 385, 386-87 (1984). However, United States Supreme Court decisions have done much to
diminish the validity of these public policy concerns. Id. at 386-87. Wrongful life is generally
denied as a cause of action for a number of policy reasons including: 1) the inherent value of
human life, 2) the inability to measure the difference between life in a defective condition and
no life at all, 3) the difficulty in determining the proximate cause of a child's defects, 4) the
deference by courts to legislative decision-making, 5) the nonexistence of a right not to be
born, 6) the flood of litigation that would be caused by recognition of a cause of action, and 7)
the excessive economic burden that would be placed on the medical profession if the cause of
action were allowed. Elizabeth F. Collins, An Overview and Analysis Prenatal Tort&Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 703 (1984); see Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 929 (determining injury in
wrongful life action is impossible).
127. Wrongful birth has been recognized in at least eighteen states and the District of
Columbia. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (Supp. 1990) (Maine); Robak v.
United States, 658 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1981) (Alabama); Ghallager v. Duke Univ., 638 F.
Supp. 979, 982 (M.C.N.C. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988)
(North Carolina); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 548-49 (D.S.C. 1981) (South
Carolina); Andalon v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 899, 905 (Cal. App. 1984) (California);
Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 883 (D.C. 1987) (District of Columbia); Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (Florida); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen.
Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 695 (Ill. 1987) (Illinois); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d
1151, 1158 (La. 1988) (Louisiana); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 412 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Mich. App. 1987)
(Michigan); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 348 (N.H. 1986) (New Hampshire); Procanik v.
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (New Jersey); Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813
(N.Y. 1978) (New York); Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania);
Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 850 (Texas); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829-30 (Va. 1982)
(Virginia); Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 488 (Wash. 1983) (Washington);
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W. Va. 1985) (West Virginia); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Wis. 1975) (Wisconsin).
128. See Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848 (placing duty on physician to disclose risk of continued pregnancy); see also Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925 (finding wrongful birth to be action based
in established negligence law). A key to this recognition is almost certainly the United States
Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the right to have an abortion falls within a woman's
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reasonable9 manner have been held liable for the damages their negligence
12
creates.

The ultimate duty of an adoption agency is to act in the best interests of
the child, not the adoptive parents. 130 Notwithstanding this duty, the adoption agency serves much the same purposes for adoptive parents as the physician does for natural parents. 131 Therefore, just as Texas imposes liability
on a physician who negligently misleads natural parents to believe that no
constitutional right of privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Prior to the Court's
recognition of this right, few courts in the nation examined the validity of wrongful birth as a
cause of action. Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100
HARV. L. REV. 2017, 2020 (1987). In one case, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined
that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). A key element of this decision was the fact that only a
few states allowed eugenic abortions, those abortions performed for reasons other than to preserve health of mother. Id. Therefore, denying a woman the right to make a decision whether
or not to adopt was insubstantia. Accordingly, the case law quickly developed after the
United States Supreme Court placed greater emphasis on a woman being denied the opportunity to decide whether or not to proceed with her pregnancy. See Susan Kempf LeMay, The
Emergence of WrongfulAdoption as a CauseofAction, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 487 (1989) (denial of
opportunity to make informed decision is basis of wrongful birth action).
129. See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 928 (permitting parent's cause of action for negligence);
see also Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 850 (allowing suit to recover cost of caring for child born with
birth defects due to physicians negligence). Determining the amount of damages caused by a
doctor's negligence presents some problems. See John R. Brantley, Comment, Wrongful Birth:
The EmergingStatus of a New Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 152 (1976) (explaining that parents receive some benefit from child). For example, it is not uncommon for a court to reduce
the amount recovered for the wrongful birth of a defective child by the benefit one receives in
having a child regardless of defects. See John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 727 (1987) (discussing application of "benefit rule").

Notwithstanding this possible reduction in the amount of damages for which doctors may be
liable, the possibility of a wrongful birth suit encourages doctors to exercise due care in their
prenatal duties. See Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment,
100 HARV. L. REV. 2017, 2022 (1987) (doctors will take care to provide expecting parents
with necessary information).
130. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED

STATES § 201, at 851 (2d ed. 1988) (purpose of statutes is to protect all parties to adoption
process). Ideally, the adoptee should benefit the most from an adoption. Constance J. Miller,

Comment, Best Interests of Children and the Interests of Adoptive Parents: Isn't it Time for
Comprehensive Reform?, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 749, 755 (1985-86).
131. Compare Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848 (finding physician had duty to disclose risk in
continuing pregnancy) with Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal.
Rptr. 504, 513 (Cal. App. 1988) (finding adoption agency had duty to disclose facts concerning

health of adopted child). See Susan Kempf LeMay, The Emergence of Wrongful Adoption as a
Cause of Action, 27 J. FAM. L. 475, 486-87 (1989) (analogizing wrongful birth with wrongful
adoption). Unfortunately, the interests of the adoptive parents are most commonly the last to
be considered, if ever. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK,
UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 169 (1989) (stating that, in
agency adoption, main client is child not adoptive parents).
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unusual risk will exist if they have a child,' 32 so too should Texas impose
liability for an adoption agency's negligent misrepresentation or non-

disclosure. 133
2. Negligence Per Se
It is a cornerstone of tort law that when a statute establishes what actions
shall or shall not be taken under certain circumstances, deviation from this
standard may constitute negligence in itself.1 34 However, although Section
16.032 of the Texas Family Code clearly requires an adoption agency to
report the pertinent history of an adoptee, 35 a violation of this provision
does not necessarily establish negligence per se.
To establish negligence per se in a Texas court, there must be an unexcused violation of a legislative enactment.1 36 Focusing on what constitutes
132. See Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 848 (imposing upon physician duty to reasonably disclose
risks of continuing pregnancy); see also Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925 (Robertson, J., concurring)
(characterizing wrongful birth as cause of action based on negligent prenatal advice). In other
words, the physician "must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed
and employed by members of the profession in good standing." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 187 (5th ed. 1984).
133. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 964 (1991) (proposing liability for both negligent misrepresentation and nondisclosure). Even where information about an adoptee cannot
be obtained, notice of this unavailability must be given to the adoptive parents so that they can
make a decision whether to continue with the adoption or not. Id. Individuals simply cannot
be denied the opportunity to make informed decisions regarding parenthood. See Note,
Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2017,
2020-21 (1987) (discussing woman's right to choose abortion).
134. Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543, 544 (Minn. 1889) (comparing common law
negligence with negligence per se). Case law in Texas dealing with negligence per se is plentiful. See, e.g., El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. 1987) (finding sale of liquor
in violation of license negligence per se); Moughon v. Wolf, 576 S.W.2d 603, 606 (Tex. 1978)
(determining that violation of traffic statute qualifies as negligence per se); Parrott v. Garcia,
436 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. 1969) (finding participant in drag race negligent per se). Negligence per se is commonly employed to impose civil liability on one who has violated a criminal
statute. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at
220-21 (5th ed. 1984). For example, violations of traffic regulations are commonly used as the
basis for negligence per se. See Carter v. William Sommerville & Son, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 274,
278 (Tex. 1979) (listing series of negligence per se decisions based on traffic violations). However, a court does not necessarily have to accept the violation of a statute as negligence in itself.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288B (1965). Even if the violation is not taken as constituting negligence, it may still be used as evidence of negligence. Id.
135. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
136. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex. 1977).
This standard is a modification of § 288B of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS which
provides, "The unexcused violation of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation
which is adopted by the court as defining the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, is
negligence in itself." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288 (1965).
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an excuse to the violation of a statute, the Supreme Court of Texas has followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts and determined that violations of a
statute may be excused when
a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
b) he neither knows nor should have known of the occasion for
compliance;
c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct; or
e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to
others. 137
It is doubtful that an adoption agency failing to comply with Section 16.032
of the Texas Family Code would be able to assert any of these excuses for its
noncompliance.' 38 Although Texas courts also state that negligence per se is
only established when the injured party belongs to the group of persons a
statute is designed to protect, 139 Section 16.032 is clearly designed to protect

137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965). This provision of the Restatement has been cited verbatim by Texas courts. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 552 S.W.2d at 102;

Impson v. Structural Metals, Inc., 487 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1972). In a wrongful adoption
action, the adoptive parents would have to prove that no excuse existed for an adoption
agency's violation of Section 16.032 of the Texas Family Code. See Southern Pacific Co. v.
Castro, 493 S.W.2d 491, 498 (Tex. 1973) (placing burden of proving unexcused violation on
party claiming negligence per se); see also Impson, 487 S.W.2d at 696-97 (finding negligence

per se based on lack of evidence excusing violation of statute).
138. See Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents:
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 964 (1991) (explaining that more thorough
child assessment procedures should not be overly burdensome). Furthermore, because TDHS
has already enacted its own policies which go beyond the statutory guidelines, it seems obvious
that complying with Section 16.032 is not overly difficult. See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d
1427, 1432 (5th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 904 F.2d 705, and cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct.
712, 112 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1991) (noting state policies going beyond requirements of disclosure
provision).
139. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985)
(finding victim raped in vacant apartment within class of persons protected by statute requiring security of such structures); MissouriPacific R.R. Co., 552 S.W.2d at 103 (finding owner of
building damaged by railroad within class of persons covered by statute regulating railroad's
operation); Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 206 S.W.2d 587, 590 (Tex. 1947) (placing
individual injured by non-licensed driver within class of persons protected by provision requiring license). This test for determining whether an injured party is within a protected class is
also adapted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of
a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
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the adoptive parents' interest in making an informed decision. 14° Accordingly, where an adoption agency makes an unexcused violation of Section
16.032 of the Texas Family Code, thereby denying adoptive parents the right
to make an informed decision, such noncompliance would constitute negligence per se.
3.

Proximate Causation

Whether one determines negligence based on a wrongful birth analogy or
based on the violation of Section 16.032 of the Texas Family Code, recovery
will not be granted unless the injury incurred by the adoptive parents is
proximately caused by the adoption agency's negligence. 141 Texas has determined that proximate causation consists of two elements, cause in fact and
foreseeability. 142 Establishing causation in fact requires a determination that
"but for" a party's negligent act, no harm would have occurred. 4 3 Foreseeability is a determination that an individual of ordinary intelligence would
anticipate the possible injuries that could result from his negligent

conduct. 1"
The injuries flowing from an adoption agency's misrepresentations, such

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
140. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.032 (Vernon Supp. 1992) (requiring adoption
agency to provide adoptive parents with adoptee's history prior to first meeting with child).
141. See Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex.
1977) (finding negligence per se only indicates possible liability). Thus, negligence will not be a
basis for liability unless there would have been no injury but for the defendant's negligent
conduct. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at
266 (5th ed. 1984).
142. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex. 1987) (imposing liability for
liquor licensee's negligence only after determination of proximate causation); see also Farley v.
M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755-57 (Tex. 1975) (finding evidence sufficient to allow jury
determination of proximate cause).
143. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985). "But for"
causation means that the negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in the cause of an
injury, and absent such an act, no injury would have occurred. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 552
S.W.2d at 103. Although the "but for" requirement is indispensable, it is not the absolute rule
that a defendant's negligent act which occurs somewhere in the chain of antecedents is the
legal cause of an injury. Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV.
103, 109 (1911). If this were the case, the mother of an unlawfully begotten child would be
liable for all of his criminal acts because he would not have committed them "but for" being
born. James Angell McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 155-56 (1925).
Thus an adoption agency could feasibly claim that it is not liable for its negligent misrepresentation because such negligence did not cause an adopted child's unexpected impairment. See
Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis,, 437 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Wis. 1989) (denying claim for
emotional distress because injury too remote from negligent conduct).
144. El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 313. Foreseeability does not require establishing that the
negligent actor should have anticipated the specific injury which occurred. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d
at 550-5 1. Rather, all that must be established is that the actor should have reasonably antici-
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as the cost of caring for a handicapped child with difficulties, are easily foreseeable. ' 45 With the aid of a properly researched report outlining the pertinent medical and familial background of an adoptee, adoptive parents would
never unknowingly accept risks which would be made clear in the report.' 46
However, where an adoption agency knows or should have known of the
potential for such defects and yet negligently misrepresents or omits this
information, an injury necessarily follows from such negligence.' 4 7 Accordingly, there is little difficulty in determining proximate causation in a wrongful adoption action.
E. Related Matters
Although Texas mandates the disclosure of an adopted child's pertinent
history, and sufficient bases exist to hold actionable the negligent performance of this duty, at least two related matters must be examined to fully
determine the validity of wrongful adoption in the state. First, it is necessary
to determine how the appropriate statute of limitations should be applied.
Secondly, a proper standard for damages must be set.
1. The Statute of Limitations
Any wrongful adoption lawsuit based on a misrepresentation, whether intentional or negligent, would be governed by Section 16.003 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code which establishes that such a suit must be
brought within two years after the cause of action accrues.' 48 Therefore,
pated that some injury would come from his action. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 552 S.W.2d at
103-104.
145. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Wis. 1986) (explaining that because risk of adoptee developing Huntington's Disease was foreseeable, agency engaged in deception); see also Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, Dep't of Adoptions, 247
Cal. Rptr. 504, 513 (Cal. App. 1988) (finding injury to adoptive parents results in denial of
opportunity to make informed decision). However, not all negligent misrepresentations concerning an adoptee's health are attributable to an adoption agency. See Foster by Foster v.
Bass, 575 So. 2d 967, 978-79 (Miss. 1990) (excusing agency reliance on negligent misrepresentations of hospital).
146. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1104 (adoptive couple testified that, with disclosure, they
would not have considered child for adoption); see also Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment,
The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 94345 (1991) (discussing adoptors' need for disclosure).
147. Cf. James M. Parker, Comment, Wrongful Life: The Child's Cause of Action for
Negligent Genetic Counseling in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 647 (1985) (discussing determination of causation in wrongful life action). An agency's negligence does not cause a child's
defects, but it does deny the adoptive parents an opportunity to make an informed choice,
thereby causing their damages. Cf. id. (explaining that physician's negligent genetic counseling denies natural parents opportunity to abort defective child).
148. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986); see Texas Am. Corp.
v. Woodbridge Joint Venture, 809 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ de-
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determining the date of accrual is essential in establishing the validity of a
wrongful adoption lawsuit.149 Because an adopted child's impairment may
not be discovered until many years after the adoption, an accrual date set at
the date of an agency's misrepresentation would leave adoptive parents with
little chance of discovering the agency's blameworthy conduct within the
two years allotted under Section 16.003.150
Fortunately for adoptive parents, in Texas a cause of action based in fraud
will not accrue until the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered
by reasonable diligence. 5' Similarly, Texas has also been willing to apply
this "discovery rule" to negligence cases involving "inherently undiscoverable causes of action."' 5 2 Applying this rule to a wrongful adoption action
based in negligence will protect against adoptive parents being denied recovery simply because the effects of an adoption agency's negligence lay dormant until many years after the fact.

nied) (applying two year statute of limitations to action based on negligent misrepresentation);
Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ) (applying two
year statute of limitations to action based in fraud); Vergal Bourlard Home Appliances v.
Altheimer & Baer, Inc., 362 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e) (applying two year statute of limitations to action based on intentional
misrepresentation).
149. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1107-08 (Ohio 1986) (determining date of accrual for wrongful adoption). For example, in Burr, the case which created wrongful adoption as a cause of action, the accrual date of the applicable statute of
limitations was the date that the damage was discovered. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.09 (Baldwin 1990) (delaying accrual for fraud until discovered). Accordingly, the
Burr's action was not barred when they sued an adoption agency for wrongful adoption some
eighteen years after the fraud occurred. Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1108.
150. See John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L.
REV. 709, 721 (1987) (discussing implications of accrual date set at date of fraud).
151. See, e.g., Escontrias v. Apodaca, 629 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1982) (denying recovery
because fraud should have been discovered); Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981)
(denying recovery for fraud due to constructive notice of probate records); Wise v. Anderson,
359 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. 1962) (denying recovery for fraud due to plaintiff's knowledge of
facts which should have led to discovery); Whatley v. National Bank of Commerce, 555
S.W.2d 500, 505 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (finding failure to plead date of discovery bars limitations as defense).
152. See Mann v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 79, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying
discovery rule to injury negligently caused by defective intrauterine device). The discovery
rule was first recognized in Texas to allow recovery for objects negligently left in the body after
an operation. See Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. 1967) (involving surgical
sponge negligently left inside patient). This was the necessary recognition of the fact that a
patient may not learn of such negligence for some time after the statute of limitations had run.
Id. The discovery rule has subsequently been applied to other causes of action which are
determined to be inherently undiscoverable. See Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 602
F. Supp. 252, 254 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (applying discovery rule to injuries caused by exposure to

asbestos).
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The Open Courts Provision

The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that Article One, Section
Thirteen of the Texas Constitution, the "open courts" provision,-

3

protects

"the right to bring a well-established common law cause of action" from
unreasonable and arbitrary legislative restriction. 154 Although wrongful

adoption itself is yet to be recognized in Texas, the basic principles of tort
law which support the cause of action most certainly are.' 55 Characterizing
wrongful adoption not as a novel judicial creation, but instead as an action
based in established tort law would protect those seeking to recover for
wrongful adoption from an unreasonable limitations period.' 56 A statute of
limitations which required the impossible, that a party sue for wrongful
adoption before knowing
of his right to sue, would not only be unreasonable,
157
absurd.
be
it would
3. Damages: The Inapplicability of the "Benefit Rule"
The rule for compensating those injured by the tortious behavior of another is that the injured party should be put into the position he would have
been absent the tortfeasor's blameworthy conduct.'5 5 Texas courts applying
this rule to wrongful birth actions have awarded damages equivalent to the

153. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. The "open courts" provision provides: "All courts shall
be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law." Id.
154. See, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tex. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring) (reasoning that wrongful birth qualifies as established cause of action); Sax v. Votteler,
648 S.W.2d 661, 665-66 (Tex. 1983) (refusing to allow statute of limitations to effectively bar
minor's cause of action for medical malpractice); Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 192 Tex. 192,
195, 275 S.W.2d 951, 952-53 (1955) (ordinance which immunized city from liability for damages caused by defective streets violated Article I, § 13 of Texas Constitution).
155. Cf. Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925-26 (Robertson, J., concurring) (recognizing wrongful
birth as nothing more than traditional negligence cause of action). There has been similar
recognition of the underlying tort principles in other "new" causes of action. See Phillips v.
United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D.S.C. 1981) (recognizing wrongful birth as based in
conventional tort law).
156. Cf Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 926 (Robertson, J., concurring) (arguing that Article I,
§ 13 of Texas Constitution protects wrongful birth from unreasonable statute of limitations).
157. See, e.g., Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 923 (refusing to allow statute of limitations which
potentially made wrongful birth action impossible); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex.
1973) (applying discovery rule to injury from negligently performed vasectomy); Gaddis, 417
S.W.2d at 581 (labeling statute of limitations which denied recovery for sponge left inside
patient "shocking").
158. See, e.g., Boles v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 680 F.2d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 1982) (allowing future damages for rape victim); see also Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25
(Tex. 1984) (discussing possible damages for wrongful life). This necessitates comparing the
plaintiff's position after the negligent conduct with his position had there been no negligence.
Id.
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extraordinary expenses necessary for the care and treatment of the child
born with a physical impairment. 5 9 Thus, in a wrongful adoption suit similar damages would be an appropriate award for adoptive parents encumbered with the unforeseen expenses of raising an impaired child 6due
to an
0

adoption agency's negligent misrepresentations or nondisclosure.'
It is also important to note that in determining damages for a wrongful
16
birth action, courts commonly apply what is known as the "benefit rule," '
159. See Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 850 (Tex. 1975) (allowing recovery for expenses reasonably necessary for care of child's impairment). In a wrongful birth action, the
extraordinary expenses are those which are caused by the child's defect. See Brian McDonough, Comment, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 77
(1981) (discussing various methods of determining damages for wrongful birth). However, the
issue of determining damages in a wrongful birth action are not uniform across the nation. See
Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp 1309, 1315 (D.S.C. 1983) (discussing divergence of approaches to wrongful birth damages). Some jurisdictions choose to go beyond Texas' allowance for extraordinary expenses and allow additional recovery for pain and suffering or mental
anguish. See Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494 (Wash. 1983) (determining
that damages are recoverable in wrongful birth action for emotional stress proximately caused
by physician's negligence). Furthermore, at least one jurisdiction has gone even further and
allowed recovery for all the costs of raising the child, not just the extraordinary expenses. See
Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1981) (allowing recovery for all expenses resulting from birth of impaired child).
160. See Burr v. Board of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1108 (Ohio 1986) (allowing recovery of extraordinary expenses in wrongful birth action). The extraordinary expenses incurred in the care of an impaired child are capable of objective determination. See
Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 849 (explaining that expenses related to care of deformed child lie within
methods of proof common to personal injury cases); see also Brian McDonough, Comment,
Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 80 (1981) (arguing that
damages for wrongful birth are analogous to those easily determined in other personal injury
torts). However, the inability to determine damages does not necessarily bar recovery. See
Hindman v. Texas Lime Co., 157 Tex. 592, 600-01, 305 S.W.2d 947, 955 (1957) (allowing
recovery of indeterminable damages occurring over long period of time); see also Southwest
Battery Corp. v. Owen, 131 Tex. 423, 427-28, 115 S.W.2d 1097, 1099 (1938) (allowing recovery of damages where amount uncertain). However, it is the fact that the damages for wrongful adoption are within determinable bounds that reinforces the argument for their recognition
in Texas. See Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925 (refusing to allow recovery for wrongful life because
of impossibility of determining damages).
161. See John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L.
REV. 709, 728 (1987) (advocating non-application of benefit rule in wrongful adoption actions); see also John R. Brantley, Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New
Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 152 (1976) (noting recognition in wrongful birth actions of benefits received by parents). For example, in a wrongful birth action the benefits of being a parent
are weighed against all the damages caused by a physician's negligence. See Brian McDonough, Comment, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 79-80
(1981) (discussing various applications of benefit rule to wrongful birth). In wrongful pregnancy cases, the benefit rule has been used to deny any recovery. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496
S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974) (denying recovery for damages in wrongful pregnancy suit); see also Teddy Lee
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found in Section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable. 162
Thus, the benefit rule, as applied to a wrongful birth scenario, recognizes the
fact that although a physician's negligence harms the parents, these parents
still benefit from the parent-child relationship regardless of the child's impairments. 163 Relying on this reasoning, an adoption agency involved in a
wrongful adoption lawsuit could similarly assert that any damages caused by
its negligence should be reduced by the benefits received by the adoptive
parents. 164
However, the logic supporting the benefit rule is not applicable to wrongful adoption.1 63 Under the benefit rule, for one to receive a reduction in the

Mann, Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages Recoverable for the Birth of a Normal,
Healthy Child, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 387 (1984) (noting public policy argument that
benefit of healthy child outweighs any detrimental economic consequences). Similarly, the
benefit of a life, albeit an impaired life, can be seen as outweighing the damages in a wrongful
life action. See James M. Parker, Jr., Comment, Wrongful Life: The Child's Cause of Action
for Negligent Genetic Counseling in Texas, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 649 (1985) (discussing
barriers to recognition of wrongful life in Texas).
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1980).

163. See John R. Brantley, Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New
Tort, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 140, 152 (1976) (explaining that benefit rule has been praised because
it allows trier of fact to evaluate circumstances of particular case). Courts that apply the
benefit rule claim that it will prevent parents from receiving a windfall and at the same time
lessen any undue financial burden placed on physicians. Teddy Lee Mann, Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages Recoverable for the Birth of a Normal, Healthy Child, 7 AM. J.
TRIAL. ADVOC. 385, 390 (1984). This logic apparently is applicable to other, analogous torts
in Texas. See Terrell, 496 S.W.2d at 124, 128 (denying recovery for wrongful pregnancy because benefits of child outweigh economic loss). However, Texas courts refuse to adopt the
benefit rule outright. See Hickman v. Myers, 632 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex. App. 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (refusing to equate benefit of having child with economic burden of rearing child).
164. See John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 728
(1987) (discussing applicability of benefit rule to wrongful adoption). In fact, because the
award in the case which created wrongful adoption was relatively low in value, $125,000, there
is some possibility that the benefit rule already has been applied. See Burr, 491 N.E.2d at 1108
(upholding award of $125,000); see also John R. Maley, Comment, WrongfulAdoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20
IND. L. REV. 709, 726 n. 120 (1987) (noting possibility that during deliberations, jury deducted
benefit of parent-child relationship). The decision in Meracle indicates the use of similar logic.
See Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wis., 437 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Wis. 1989) (awarding
only extraordinary medical expenses incurred due to adoption agency's negligence).
165. See John R. Malley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Supe-
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damages caused by his tortious conduct, it must be his tortious conduct
which conferred the benefit. 166 In a wrongful birth action, the injured party
would have no child, and thus no benefit, but for the physician's negligence. 1 67 Applying this rule to the circumstances surrounding a wrongful
adoption suit, prospective adopters will eventually adopt a child and enjoy
the benefits of that relationship regardless of tortious conduct on the part of
a given adoption agency.' 68 Accordingly, in a wrongful adoption suit, the
amount of damages recovered by adoptive parents should not be offset under
the benefit rule because any beneficial, parent-child relationship was not
169
caused by the negligent acts of the adoption agency.

rior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L.
REV. 709, 728 (1987) (noting that applying benefit rule to wrongful adoption overlooks basic
premise of rule).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1980) (requiring that if damages for
tortious act are to be reduced, benefit must be conferred by tortious act); see also Teddy Lee
Mann, Comment, Wrongful Pregnancy: Damages Recoverable for the Birth of a Normal,
Healthy Child, 7 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 385, 390 (1984) (explaining that for wrongful life,
benefit rule mitigates damages only for benefits which result from birth of healthy child). As
such, it is imperative that one determine the cause of the benefit. See Brian McDonough,
Comment, Wrongful Birth: A Child of Tort Comes of Age, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 65, 79 (1981)
(discussing various interpretations of benefit rule). Under one interpretation of the benefit rule
as it applies to wrongful birth, if the benefit is somehow not related to the purpose for the
doctor's treatment, no reduction in damages is allowed. Id. Therefore, if a woman became
pregnant after a sterilization operation which was performed to prevent aggravation of her
kidneys, having the child would have to somehow benefit the woman's kidney condition. See
Custudio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476 (Cal. App. 1967) (discussing application of benefit
rule to wrongful pregnancy).
167. See Jacobs, 519 S.W.2d at 847 (noting that physician's negligence was undisputed
cause of impaired child's birth); see also Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 925 (Robertson, J., concurring)
(explaining wrongful birth as action allowing recovery for expenses proximately caused by
physician's negligence).
168. See John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L.
REV. 709, 728-29 (1987) (arguing against the application of benefit rule to wrongful adoption).
The incredible number of couples seeking to adopt demonstrates the determination held by
those unable to have a child on their own. See NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION,
ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATIONS AND RESOURCES 157

(1989) (prospective adopters could number in millions).
169. John R. Maley, Comment, Wrongful Adoption as a Superior Remedy to Annulment
for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709, 729 (1987). Allowing a blameworthy adoption agency to reduce its damages because of the benefit the adoptive parents receive from the adoptee would be a misinterpretation of the benefit rule which
allows a reduction of damages only where the tortious conduct benefited the plaintiff's interest.
Cf Dierdre A. Burgman, Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate and Mishandlingby JudicialFiat, 13 VAL. U. L. REV. 127, 158 (1978) (explaining that only benefit to plaintiff's interest
can be used to reduce damages). Because the adoptive parents' interest is to adopt a healthy
child, an adoption agency's tortious conduct does nothing to benefit them. Cf id. (explaining
that determining application of benefit rule in wrongful pregnancy requires determination of
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CONCLUSION

Recent cases interpreting wrongful adoption demonstrate the evolving
process of tort law. These cases show a definite progression, yet inadequacies remain. Inherent within this development is the underlying lack of recognition in adoption law for the interests of adoptive parents. As matters
stand, the necessary progression of wrongful adoption calls for the imposition of a duty on adoption agencies to disclose to adoptive parents the pertinent history of the adopted child and liability for agencies which negligently
discharge this duty. Absent such a standard, outdated policies of silence and
the inadequate examination of an adoptee's health will invariably continue.
Such inadequacies do not benefit any member of the adoption triangle. Biological parents are hesitant to give up their child, adoptive parents bear unnecessary risks when they adopt, and adopted children may be denied
treatment they unknowingly need.
Texas adoption law is advanced in comparison to the laws applied in other
states. Even so, much needs to be done to perfect the adoption process.
Ultimately, it must be acknowledged that adoptive parents deserve the opportunity to make a fully informed decision about adoption. However, what
should be and what can be are not always in agreement. Fortunately, the
climate is ripe for the application of wrongful adoption in Texas. Furthermore, both the substantive and procedural elements necessary to properly
advance the tort are available within the state. As such, Texas has an opportunity to improve a necessary tool of family law by recognizing and advancing wrongful adoption.

purpose for attempted birth control). This principle is similar to the fact that an individual
guilty of slander cannot reduce the damages his conduct caused by the benefit the injured party
may have received, such as publicity, from the slanderous behavior. Id. As such, the recoverable damages should include all direct and consequential damages caused by an adoption
agency's tortious conduct. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 766 (5th ed. 1984) (establishing appropriate damages for
misrepresentation).
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